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INTRODUCTION
Scholars and statesmen as well as casual observers of the
international scene are often attracted to beliefs which measure
a problem in question by the application of a single academic
discipline as the only true measuring stick. Geography and
economics, if they can be defined as distinct disciplines, have
often been described as the systems whereby man can analyze and
even predict the causes and nature of international boundary
conflicts. These beliefs can be questioned.
In judging a boundary a geographer must consider many phys-
ical as well as human aspects of a region. Eric Fischer, in a
dissertation on boundaries, reminds us that in considering
boundaries the emphasis "has shifted from one aspect of the
problem to another according to the particular bias of the
times." 1
At the time of the Paris Peace conferences,
geographers shared the general opinion that the lin-
guistic factor should receive the greatest consider-
ation in determining boundaries between national
states. Language was regarded as the best criterion
for drawing boundaries which would recognize what was
called at that date 'the right of self-determination.'
It was a new factor in diplomatic negotiations. Shift
of emphasis from physical features to cultural char-
acteristics as bases for boundary lines reflected thepopular swing toward self-determination.
A further change of attitude seems to have de-
veloped in recent years. The negotiations and treat-ies which followed World War II ... were primarily
and openly concerned with the economic effects of theirdecisions. The shift in stress within a short time'
1*1! QA
Fischer
»
"0n Boundaries," World Politics
. January1949, 1:196.
from one factor to another reflect* th» * .character of s« criteria of bound^ry^maUnlT*
The subject of this report concerns an international
boundary problem and the approach is geographical; but this is
-t meant to imply that geograp„ y^ ., ^^^^furnishes all the tools for a just answer to the question. The
specific geographical approach is cartographic and no
..solution"
has been sought. There is no implication intended that a carto
graphic study „f a border controversy is a choice of a position
an the question of which approach is best.
The subject of this report is that portion of the "MacMahonLine' which forms the ptq + ^-k,-, nu • Teastern Chana-India boundary and a portion
of the northern China-Burma boundary. The primary emphasis hasbeen placed on the Indian portion of the line because of the
-moment of the Burma boundary problem in TO0
. The ,„
controversy is herein analysed primarily with maps because the
Protagonists involved, and outside observers h, „^server , ave thoroughly
investigated every other aspect of the question.
by Persons anterested in the China-India border controversy
Primarily as a map reference when studying one of the
_, , .
' "*> i many com-prehensive reports of th; B • AP this international dispute.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Sine Z"T " mSke a CMPlete hlSt °riCal -*- " -S^an^rder^roblem would be beyond the purpose of this
Loc. cit.
paper and the scope of the author's- ability. But a brief resume
of some of the events which led to the establishment of the
MacMahon line will help to indicate why the problem was not
solved as a result of the Simla conferences of 1913 and 1914.
The key, according to Olaf Caroe, is the Dalai Lama.^ The
succession of Dalai Lamas began in the late fifteenth or early
sixteenth centuries, but the firm position as a spiritual and
temporal leader of Tibet was not held by any of the succeeding
Lamas until these powers were consolidated by the fifth Dalai
Lama in 1640. There is no indication that China held any power
in Tibet at that time. At this same time, 1644, the great Ching
or Manchu dynasty assumed power in China. The Manchus, in ex-
panding China to the greatest extent in its history, conquered
Tibet in 1720. From that time on China has made incursions into
Tibet, has ruled Tibet, has been driven from Tibet, has been
associated with Tibet as an enemy state, and has held suzerainty
over Tibet,
Just before the fall of the Manchu empire in 1911 a military
force was sent to Tibet to reaffirm Chinese authority. With the
fall of the Manchus, this force became isolated and was eventually
evacuated through India. This ended all Chinese occupation of
Tibet; but Yuan Shih-kai the leader of the First Chinese Republic,
with his dreams of a new dynasty, continued the old policy of
assimilation toward Tibet.
Olaf Caroe, "The India-Tibet-China Triangle," Asian Review,
January 1960, 56:4.
4 TLoc. cit
It is interesting to note in an article written at the time
of the fall of the Manchu empire that many observers did not
recognize the problems that- were being created. 5 The author,
W. W. Rockhill, in describing the optimism of observers of the
Chinese domestic scene, expresses no vision of the tragedies to
come, the future chaos in the far east, and the bedrock of
corrupt government upon which the Chinese Communist party could
prey and create the conditions of today.
Yuan Shih-kai, in his attempts to assimilate Tibet, made a
declaration that Tibet would henceforth be a Chinese province.
The British protested strongly, and while conceding that China
had suzerainty over Tibet, Britain could not consent to Chinese
sovereignty over a state "enjoying independent treaty relations
with her." 6 The Chinese at this point were in no position to
oppose any nation. They stated that they had "no intention of
converting Tibet into another province of China, and that the
preservation of the traditional system of Tibetan Government was
as much the desire of China as of Great Britain. "7
The Dalai Lama declared the independence of Tibet in 1913
and at the same time negotiated with the other great Lamaist
state, Outer Mongolia, for a policy of mutual recognition. At
this time Britain initiated the triangular conference at Simla
5 W. Woodville Rockhill, "Brief Review of Present Conditions
in China," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society
, 1914, 1:34
6
K. Krishna Rao, "The Sino-Indian Boundary Question and
International Law," I nternational and Comparative Law Quarterly
,
April 1962, 11:399.
7 TLoc. Clt.
between Britain, Tibet, and China which lasted from October 1913
to July 1914. During the conferences Tibet reeraphasized its
independence while China claimed suzerainty over Tibet, and Great
Britain advocated a division of the area into an Inner and Outer
Tibet with Britain acting as the intermediary between Tibet as
the vassal state and China as its sovereign. 9 Just before the
outbreak of World War I, agreement was reached by the negoti-
ators on the future status of Tibet. Tibet would be divided
into Inner and Outer regions in the same manner that Mongolia
was split. The Tibetans acknowledged a loose allegiance to
China that was described as Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, and
the Chinese acknowledged the autonomy of Outer Tibet. 10 It was
agreed that the frontier between Inner and Outer Tibet would run
roughly along the Upper Yangtze River while the southern boundary
between Tibet and British India would follow the remainder of
what was later to be called the MacMahon line (Plate I).
During the period from 1912, when the Chinese were driven
from Tibet, until 1950, when they invaded in strength, there is
no evidence of any control, either de facto or de jure, of Tibet
by the Chinese government.
Both India and China have used historical evidence upon
which to base their claims to the disputed areas. Both nations
have valid historical claims, and both have used evidence which
is questionable.
' E
^
S2P. M# Gale » "International Relations: The TwentiethCentury," China, p. 206.
q.
Loc. cit.
10 Caroe, og. cit., p e 5.

THE MACMAHON LINE
PrM 0Ct0b
" 19" t0 J^ «M «r Henry MacMahon, Secretary
of State for Poreign «fM„ in the British.Indiaa^^
negotiated with representative, of the Chinese £ nd Tibetan
governments on the demarcation of India's northeastern border H
The agreement which resuited from these negotiations established
a border between Tibet and British Jndia which extends along the
crest of the „inalayas from Bhutan on the west to a point caned
Isu Ra2i on the MeKong-Saiween watershed in the east." These
negotiations established a border that bas recently led to a
conflict between China and Xndia which could result in significant
changes an international. alliances involving several nations.
-Sardless of the isoiated nature or the seeming insignificance
ox this area, the fir* +-V.-+. /^u •«, n i act that China and Indi-> a™ *-<± aia aie tue disputants
«y eventually iead to a political realignment of some of the
nations of Asia and the Western Pacific. This is not intendedi- any way to imply
, however> ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^
sarily co„plete]
. y i£0lated „ insignificant
_ The
the most popuious area of Tibet from the vaiuabie Assam piain
cannot be disregarded.
It is fully possible that the Si™ t *•Smo-Indian boundary dispute
^have occurred regardiess of the borderline delinealed by
Caroe, op., cit
. , p. 4.
oMacMahon and the other representatives at the conference. Lewis
M. Alexander, in a discussion of Chinese activities in northern
Burma, expressed this possibility simply as "expansion ... in the
guise of international communism." 13 The boundary line that Sir
Henry MacMahon drafted ran through areas of the Himalayas that
had not been extensively mapped at the time, and some areas which
have still not been mapped. Therefore, the border was not well
defined. 14 The lack of a demarcated border, if not a problem at
one point in time, may always become a zone of conflict between
the nations adjacent to the unknown or unmarked areas. MacMahon
recognized the difference between drawing a line on a map and
laying out border markings on the ground, and distinguished the
difference by using two distinct terms which he defined as
follows
:
M,•„^J!?
eli
?
ita*i0n,
*
have taken *° comprise the deter-
HTlJUi^ b?und*ry line by treaty or otherwise? and
SSS,%2L?2S.tfB by "—** *££ —th-
Considerable doubt has also existed over the racial relati
ships of the hill tribes in the disputed region; therefore, no
ethnic evidence is likely to appear which will resolve the
boundary dispute." But this> of ^^ ^ ^ ^^ ^
on-
*3 Lewis M. Alexander, World Political Patterns, p. 401.
FUrer-Haimensdorf, og. cit., Po n.
15
~~~
Rao, og. cit.
f p. 376.
J /L
Internatronafand 2ctParatIve S^""?*" B°rder D»P«te. f»tSSESi i L_aw Quarterly, January 1960, 9:97.
poa.ibility that a dispute based on cultural ground, cou!d have
arasen at any time; because either of these nations could ba«e
their claims on ethnic relationship to the population in the
disputed area. This possibility can be extended further if „
assume that one disputant is ethnically related to the aborigine
of the hill country. Because "the hill tribes of the frontier
region do not appear to have fixed territories of their own -
li,its of hill tribe occupation at the raost advantageous «-.
for the claimant." The existence of any iegiti.ate ethnically
based claim to the dismit«*rj uj—isputed Himalayan area is doubtful, because
the indigenous tribes in this area have demonstrated strong
animosity to any outside interference whether Chinese, Xndian,
or Br.tish.13 The animistic ^^ ^^^^
-teristics of the Himalayan hill tribes ma.e it doubts thatthere wiX1 ever be any proven attachment of these peopies to
either China or India. i9 £ven this __. ...
.
.
V
"
lS P°"tion, however, i s subjectto opinion as indicated bv O H v c^a oy o. . K. ^pate who stated that,
lSfi^
eir^j3ci|S^ftt|ffi4gl Of the Himalayan
'
^TtuTal and economic bourJ^ ^- * that th* rea* "
"
the mountain mass and no? on it^"
5 at the foot of
?aps often neglected tSshow the ?JSV^ Britishis not surprising thi a latter boundary, it
Played the forme? Thi?"CSe^ habi*»ally Sis-
nized in the buffer SiJeFaSS^Shnfi* "!*«<*-vweoai, Bhutan, and Sikkim),
18
,
19
Ptfrer-Haimensdorf, op_. cit.
f Po n#
J
-
H. Spencer, Asia, East by South, p. 207
.
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There are other reasons that this border dispute may have
occurred regardless of the existence of the MacMahon line,
including the type of terrain and a search for bargaining power
by China. The physical obstacles to man-s presence in this area
are great, and disputes were not likely until the adjoining
nations began to recognize more fully the strategic importance
of this area which became more significant with the advent of
modern aircraft. It is also possible that the questioning of
the MacMahon line by China may have occurred only because it
appeared advantageous to dispute this area as a bargaining
point for other territorial concessions by India. 21 The pro.
posal that China is disputing the MacMahon line strictly as a
diplomatic lever for later accession to China of the Aksai Chin
area of Ladakh appears feasible when we consider how readily
China gave up her claim to the disputed region south of the
MacMahon line in Burma (Plate I). If China „, wilJing tQ ^
the area in dispute with Burma solely to demonstrate her be
olent spirit and desire for peace, why should she be so t
in her claims for the NEPA (North East Frontier Agency) area of
India? It does seem possibie that the existence of a hostile
group such as the Khams, who occupy the area north of the NBPA
nev-
enacious
20
The Chan^-woridf^'s;?16 KgE?!. °f , X ?d j a «* Pakistan,"the SuthSFT - Parenthetical information added by
21
Review, Febru ary 1963','
C
«fo!
Ct
" tte Hil"al*yas," Military
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might be a sufficient deterrent to development of that area of
Tibet, for access to the south, to cause China to seek the Aksai
Chin instead (Plate I). The Aksai Chin is an excellent route
into southern Tibet compared with the route through the Kham
region, and there are two known times in history when this route
from the west has been used to invade Tibet. 22
The possibility of the NEFA controversy being used as a
negotiable point by China is further strengthened by the fact
that China at one time reached the point of offering to renou
all claims in the NEFA for India's concession of the Aksa
Chin. 23
nce
i
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Much of the area along the MacMahon line has not been mapped
or the data are too incomplete to make a very detailed study of
the terrain; but a general description of the area showing its
location and some terrain features is possible.
J
The general location of the MacMahon line in Southern Asia,
J
and the disputed region of the Indian Northeast Frontier Agency'
is shown on Plate I. The MacMahon line begins in the west at
approximately 91° 40" E., 27° 45" N. on the eastern border of
Bhutan, and proceeds in a northeasterly direction for 250 miles
(400 km) through a region with mountains ranging fr0m 15
,
000 to
22 _
Loc. cit.
23
-
Ibid
.. p. 7.
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23,500 feet in height. 24 This area of the border has not been
thoroughly mapped and the available relief data are incomplete.
From this area the MacMahon line extends generally in an easterly
and southeasterly direction for the remainder of its total 750
miles (1200 km) through a region with prominent terrain features
ranging from 12,000 to 20,000 feet above sea level, and termi-
nates on the present Burma-China border at a point approximately
98° 27" E., 27° 40" N. The relief data for this portion of the
border are fairly well delineated on available maps.
Fifteen years before the creation of the MacMahon line,
Thomas Holdich vividly described the border area.
Standing back some 100 miles from the plains of
India, in the centre of the Himalayan mountains, is a
magnificent central watershed (or water parting) which
stretches from Kashmir to Northern Assam. The great-
est snow~peaks and glaciers of the world are piled on
to the summits of this vast crystalline axis of the
Himalaya. Could anything be better than this magnifi-
cent array of unapproachable snow and ice to serve as
the unmistakable barrier between two vast Asiatic
countries?2 -*
The fact that Holdich was not as foresighted concerning the
penetrability of this area as the British Government was fifteen
years later, when the border was delimited, has been proven by
the incidents of the past several years in which two great
nations have struggled to gain complete control of the Indian
cis-Himalayan region. The Chinese must have been well aware of
O A
„ V"
ited States Air Force Operational Navigation Chart,Sheet H-10, Naga Hills, September 1961, and The Sino-IndianBoundary Question
, "Reference Map 6."
25
* * w
Th°mas Holdich, "The Use of Practical Geography Illus-
Ma? 1899* 13:4?9.
Fr°ntier
°peration *>" Geographic al Journal
.
13
the penetrability of the Himalayas when the revolutionary govern-
ment, temporarily headed by Yuan Shih-kai, refused to ratify the
Simla agreements of 1914. India, as the inheritor of British
treaties, also recognized the vulnerability of its northeastern
border and in 1950 began to build its defenses in the NEFA to
close the gaps in the Himalayas, The complexity of this project
has been described by A. R. Field as:
a prodigious task, for the Himalayas rarely have acted
as the barrier which small scale maps and popular
notions may have led many to believe. More than any-
thing else, these mountains have acted as a giant sieve.
There are literally thousands of passes which have never
been charted on any map.^°
Some of the numerous major mountain passes are shown on Plates II
and III.
The NEFA presents an extreme contrast both to the flat low-
lands of Assam to the south and the Tibetan plateau to the north.
The rugged mountainous terrain of the frontier region differen-
tiates it from Assam while its dense monsoon forests distinguish
it from the almost barren highlands of the Tibetan plateau.
The extreme variations in elevation along the MacMahon line
are displayed by the physical profile on Plate II. The relief
data from the Bhutan-India border to a point between Lamdo La
pass and Lusha La pass at 94° 30" E, are greatly generalized.
AH relief for this portion of the border is approximate except
for certain measured point elevations. Although the profile
does not illustrate the terrain features on either side of the
Orbis. ££; wf^VrSsS!" ^ *"* *"« UPPef AS"m Line '"
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boundary, a quick perusal of the drainage pattern map of the
area (Plate IV) makes it obvious that the elevations- lower
toward India and vary from rising to lowering on the Chinese
side of the line.
Only the major mountain passes are indicated on Plate II;
however t it must be kept in mind that numerous roads, tracks,
and trails cross the boundary at points other than at major
mountain passes. The deep cuts of the Brahmaputra and Luhit
Rivers as well as the valleys made by other streams that cross
the MacMahon line are easily discernible when portrayed on an
exaggerated profile » These deep valleys are, in most cases,
ideal locations for tracks and trails. A comparison of the
drainage pattern map (Plate IV) and the transportation map (Plate
III) reveals the close relationship between stream valleys and
roads and trails in the border region.
It is interesting to note that most of the major passes
indicated on available sources cross the MacMahon line at approx-
imately 13,000 feet. No factual evidence was found to indicate
why this was true; but it would seem acceptable to assume that '
since the major amount of traffic across this boundary is the
movement of religious pilgrims, on foot, during the warmer months
of the year, the pilgrims probably would seek the altitude with
the less undesirable temperature, humidity, and density of
vegetation. The density of mountain passes on the general route
from the lower Brahmaputra valley toward Lhasa and the upper
Brahmaputra River help to indicate that the major traffic flow
area lies along the path of major pilgrim movement. The location
17
a,
18
of these passes is shown on Plate III. There is no reason to
doubt that there are suitable physical routes for mountain passes
in other directions in as great a number as in the direction of
Lhasa, because there is no extremely great difference in the
terrain. The desire for human interaction in other directions,
however, does not exist and passes do not become landmarks where
man has little desire to move. The density of tracks and trails
through the Himalayas in this area, as portrayed on Plate III,
gives vivid evidence of the validity of A. R. Fields' description
of the Himalayas as a "giant sieve."27
The only road in the vicinity of the MacMahon line, other
than: those in the Assam valley, lies along the northern side of
the boundary in China. This road extends from the province of
Szechwan in China to Lhasa, and west along the Brahmaputra and
the northern border of Nepal. The alignment of the Szechwan-
Lhasa road on Plate III is approximate; but it appears to be the
possible location of the road to southern Tibet which was built
by the Chinese for communications in the 1950-1951 invasion for
reassertion of Chinese de facto control of Tibet. This route was
later jeopardized by the guerrilla attacks of the Kham tribesmen
which led to the construction of the Aksai Chin road through
Ladakh as an alternate route28 (Plate I).
The other roads in the area are in the Assam valley except
for the road that leads southwest from Ledo. A portion of this
27 _
Loc. cxt.
28
Rose, op., cit., p. 6.
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road is visible on Plate III and can be seen in its entirety on
Plate I as the Stilv/ell (Ledo) road which terminates on the Burma
road at Wanting, China. The original plan of the World War II
allies to bypass the Japanese in south Burma by building a supply
line to China through India led to the construction of the
Stilwell road and much of the road and railroad network in the
Brahmaputra valley. The close relationship between the road and
railroad networks in this area, and the aerodromes, as shown on
Plate III, indicates the transfer points of supplies to air-
transport means for the flight across the Himalayas to China.
The major concentration of aerodromes, many of which are now-
abandoned, indicates the great amount of aerial traffic that used
this area as an intermediate stop, or originated here, for the
famous World War II flight across the "hump." The aerodromes
that are shown as abandoned have probably been reopened since the
Chinese invasion of India in 1962. Although there is no evidence
to support this statement, there should be little doubt that
these strategic locations would be used as part of India's mili-
tary preparedness program.
The drainage pattern map of the region around the MacMahon
line (Plate IV) indicates how closely Sir Henry MacMahon followed
the watershed when the boundary was drawn at Simla. Although the
alignment of portions of the Subansiri and Luhit Rivers is ap-
proximate, there is no doubt that the rivers do cross the border
from China to India. But even considering the fact that these
rivers, as well as a tributary, of the Irrawaddy in northeast
Burma, cross the border, the boundary line as shown on most
20
current maps indicates that every attempt was made to follow the
watershed line when the boundary was delimited. This is also
evidenced by a map of the MacMahon line in a publication issued
by the Peoples' Republic of China which is, purportedly, a copy
of the original map attached to the Simla agreements. 29
Although Sir Henry MacMahon performed an exceptional task
in delimiting this boundary, the fact that he missed the water-
shed does leave the boundary open to question by those who
profess a belief in the quality of so-called natural boundaries.
The major problem in following this thesis, however, lies in the
fact that most of the region north and south of the MacMahon
line, including a major portion of Tibet, is drained by the
Brahmaputra River. If the adherents to the natural boundary-
thesis wish to consider the Brahmaputra as an exception to the
rule of watershed boundaries for the delimiting of the Sino-
Indian frontier, a revision of the boundary could follow the
pattern depicted on Plate V. This map indicates that China
would have no claim to the NEPA region, and would, in fact, be
deprived of great areas of land if a true watershed boundary
were used without any consideration of the Brahmaputra River.
Plate V portrays the revisions of the boundary that would be
required to follow the watershed and indicates by shading, the
areas of Chinese territory that would fall into the natural
boundaries of Bhutan, India, and Burma. If a natural type
boundary is to be accepted, it could follow any one of several
6."
29 Sino-Indian Boundary Question , op. cit
.
, "Reference M
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formulae. These possibilities include the boundary alignment
shown on Plate V. as well as one which would give India and the
Himalayan states all of the Brahmaputra valley, or one which
would give China all of the Brahmaputra valley to include a
major portion of Indian Assam and East Pakistan. The two latter
alternatives are, of course, as unacceptable as the alternative
shown on Plate V, and are no more, or less, valid than the
Chinese desire for placing the boundary at the base of the Indian
cis-Himalayan region,,
CONCLUSION
The MacMahon line which was delimited for political motives
can continue to exist or be disregarded for the same or other
political motives. But it is a boundary, although somewhat in-
definite, which existed for nearly 45 years without being
questioned; and this reason, not any physical structure of the
earth's surface, or yearning for days of China's former empire,
or searching for bargaining power, appears to be the best reason
for maintaining the statu s quo.
N. Pounds, in expressing the validity of the concept of
natural boundaries, emphasizes the preeminence of man's motives
in dividing the surface of the earth into political regions:
.,.,* ?er! *?' in §eneral » nothing inevitable about
??5. ?H
n
?
a
-
1G
!i
they are n0t na*«ral boundaries, or
Th" ?„ L 1? the natUre of thin g s must ^ boundaries.e idea that nature had prescribed limits to humansocieties and had expressed these limits in featuresof the natural landscape is an old one, and it Tillhazd In no context are the words of L. Febvre moreapplicable than in the study of boundaries: 'Thereare no necessities but everywhere possibilities and
23
man, as master of the possibilities is judge of their
use.' And again, 'What finally matters is the idea
adopted by the people - the political group - with
regard to their geographical position, of its char-
acteristics and advantages or inconveniences, though
this idea may be quite wrong or have no basis in re-
ality. ' All boundaries are artificial in that they
originate in human decision. The widely used term
natural boundary, with its overtones of compulsion or
necessity, is best avoided. 30
' Norman J. G. Pounds, Political Geography, pp. 79-80,
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In judging a boundary a geographer must consider many
physical as well as human aspects of a region. There is no
specific approach to the solution of a boundary problem which
can be considered the best approach. In considering boundary
problems the emphasis has shifted from one approach to another,
depending upon the bias of the period in which the dispute took
place.
The purpose of this report was to investigate that portion
of the "MacMahon Line" which forms the eastern China-India
boundary and a portion of the northern China-Burma boundary.
The primary interest in this study is devoted to the Indian
portion of the boundary because the Burma-China dispute was
settled in 1960 by China's concession of the disputed region to
Burma. The study of the problem in this report is primarily a
cartographic analysis.
A brief historical background is given to indicate the
political status of Tibet which has been, since 1720, invaded by
China, a vassal of China, freed of Chinese domination, and re-
occupied by China. The relationships of Tibet and China are
important because Tibet was a somewhat independent state when
the Simla agreement of 1914, which established the MacMahon line,
was negotiated.
The most significant factor of the problem with which the
study is concerned is the possibility that a conflict involving
China and India can have many effects on the political alignment
of the so-called "non-aligned" nations.
--:•
No ethnic evidence is available which would serve to
establish the relationship of the peoples in the disputed area
to either China or India.
Both disputants have seemingly legitimate historical claims
to the disputed region.
The cartographic analysis is made on the basis of four maps
of the disputed area and a fifth map indicating the general
location of the MacMahon line.
The extreme variations in altitude from just above 1000 feet
to nearly 24,000 feet above sea level are indicative of the
seeming impenetrability of the border; however, this region has
not been as great a barrier to the movement of man as might be
expected. The map of land transport routes and aerodromes in
the region indicates that there is much human intercourse across
the border.
The drainage pattern map portrays the accuracy of alignment
of the original boundary as delimited by Sir Henry MacMahon, but
certain revisions are also shown on a separate map to indicate a
possible revised watershed boundary.
Although the use of the concept of natural boundaries is
accepted as valid by some observers of the international scene,
there is overwhelming evidence that man's political motives are
preeminent. This makes all political boundaries artificial
because they originate in human decision.
Therefore, it is concluded that the de facto control of the
disputed area by India for 45 years should be the determinant
rather than any physical structure of the land regardless of
which side the physical structure favors.
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